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The futures market plays a major role in marketing and pricing of the 
commodities traded. It serves as a center where information relative to supply and 
demand conditions and prices is indicated. The futures market makes it possible 
to transfer the risk of price change associated with commodity ownership through 
hedging. More importantly, the development of nonstorable commodity futures 
can help stabilize price, offer producers an opportunity to contract forward at firm 
prices, guide protection, and result in more efficient resource allocation. l 
The success of futures trading, however, depends largely on the terms of the 
futures contract. The futures contract must be drawn in such a way that it is 
conducive to hedging and attractive to speculators as well. It is essential that 
there exists sufficient number of speculators who are willing to carry the risks of 
the price variation, taking chance for profits or losses. The contract should not 
yield any undue favor to traders on the long or short side of the transaction. 
Neither should it invite any possibilities of manipulation which would eventually 
discourage buyers or sellers to participate in the trading. 
In regard to the fresh shell egg futures contract, the alteration of delivery 
procedure would more or less affect the performance of the trading . When eggs 
were allowed to be delivered only from approved warehouses the eggs had to be 
stored during the delivery month, ordered inspected within two business 
days after the eggs had been placed in storage, and be delivered within three 
business days after the date of inspection. Eggs which had been delivered on 
any previous futures contract month were not eligible for delivery. The major 
advantage of warehouse deliveries was that a redelivery was permitted without 
reinspection if done within twO days after receipt by the long. 
When in-plant delivery (egg packing plant) was provided as another option 
besides warehouse delivery, the delivery system was modified to some extent. 
Eggs delivered from an approved plant entailed a one cent discount, had to be 
inspected just prior to delivery, and were not eligible for delivery in any sub-
sequent month. Eggs delivered from an approved plant could be redelivered in 
the same month providing they were stored in an approved warehouse within 
two business days after removal from the plant, passed a re-inspection and met 
all other requirements for delivery from a warehouse. Redelivery was permitted 
from a warehouse. In addition, the long receiving delivery in an approved plant 
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must remove the eggs from the plant within the following two business days 
after receipt of the notice of delivery or be penalized a daily storage charge. 
When all deliveries are required to be made at the approved egg packing 
plants, redelivery is not permitted. Inspection must be made during the month of 
delivery and not more than two business days prior to issuance of the notice of 
delivery . Eggs delivered in one month shall not be eligible for delivery in any 
subsequent month. The buyers receiving delivery must remove the eggs from the 
delivery plant within the following three business days after receipt of the notice 
of delivery or pay a daily storage charge. 
There has been criticism with respect to the validity and merit of the changes 
in delivery system of fresh shell egg futures contract. Two studies , one based on 
the interview with 79 individuals who were physically involved in the egg 
industry and who had used the egg futures contract ,2 and the other based on the 
interview with 127 individuals involved in the delivery or receiving eggs via 
futures contracts, 3 revealed egg futures traders' dissatisfaction over the ease of 
delivery under the present egg futures contract. One of the major complaints was 
that the delivery specifications yielded some undue favor towards the "short" 
making delivery. Another criticism centered around the numerous deliveries of 
eggs causing disruption of the normal channels of trade. To be precise, it was 
questioned if the change in delivery system provided any economic services to 
the egg industry as a whole. Therefore, an analysis of the impacts of the changes 
in the delivery system on various elements of fresh shell egg futures and cash 
market was a valid area of study . 
Objectives of the Study 
This study concerned itself with the analysis of the fresh shell egg futures 
contract under three periods of different delivery procedures, that is, delivery 
only from "approved cold storage warehouses", delivery from either "approved 
cold storage warehouses" or "approved egg packing plants", and delivery from 
"approved egg packing plants" only . Specifically, this study aimed at the 
following objectives. 
1. To determine the relationship between cash price and futures price at the 
maturing month of the contracts under the three periods of different delivery 
procedures . 
2. To determine how well the futures prices which exist before the maturity 
of the contract can predict cash price at the delivery month during the three 
periods of different delivery systems. 
3. To determine the profits and losses incurred to the traders, both hedgers 
and speculators, on long and short positions during the three periods of different 
delivery procedures. 
4 . To determine the cash price variation under the three periods of different 
delivery procedures. 
5. To evaluate the performance of the fresh shell egg futures contract, 
whether the changes in the delivery system are justified and are beneficial to the 
members of the egg industry as a whole. 
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Data Classification 
The data used in this study were classified into three groups according to the 
three periods of different delivery procedures of the fresh shell egg futures 
contract. The classification is indicated in Table 1, Groups I, II and III. 
Contract 
Month 
January 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
OctOber 
November 
December 
Toeal 
Group 
Table 1 
Fresh Shell Egg Futures Contracts Under Three Groups 
of Different Delivery Systems 
Group I Group II 
1969 1970 1971 1971 1972 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
.. .. .. 
Group III 
1972 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
26 con tracts II contracts 10 contracts 
I - delivery from "approved cold stOrage warehouses" only--covers contracts for 
months of February. 1969 through March . 197 I. 
Group II - delivery from either "approved cold stOrage warehouses" or "approved egg 
packing plants"--covers contracts for the months of April, 1971 through 
February. 1972 . 
Group III - delivery from "approved egg packing only"--covers contracts for the months 
of March, 1972 through December, 1972. 
The trading period of a futures contract is the time period within which the 
contract is traded in the futures market. It starts from the time the futures con-
tract is opened at a distance from the maturity of the contract and terminates on 
the business days of the contract month. The trading period for all contracts is not 
the same. Those usually having heavy trading are usually open longer. 
The old cold storage egg contract was of major use to those owning eggs in 
storage. Cold storage egg dealers usually bought eggs in the spring for holding 
until fall or winter. To suit the need of hedging by cold stOrage egg dealers, five 
contract months, namely September, October, November, December, and 
January were offered to be traded in the storage egg futures market. The fresh egg 
contract, however, permits greater use at the production level and in short-term 
assembly, processing, short-term storage and distribution operations. In order to 
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accommodate the use offutures prices as a guide of production to egg producers, 
every calendar month should be traded and each contract should remain open at 
least seven to eight months-the length of time required to produce a laying 
pullet from a fertile egg. In a response to these needs, the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange has made all calendar months eligible for futures trading under the 
present fresh shell egg futures contract. But the length of trading period for all 
contract months is far from equal. During the three periods of different delivery 
procedure, the length of time each contract month traded varied greatly from as 
short as two months to as long as one full year. The length of trading period for 
the contract was 7. 7 months for Group I; 5.8 months in Group II ; and 7.8 
months in Group III. 
It is noticeable that at the early stage of fresh shell egg futures trading, the 
most actively traded futures months were the same as for the old cold storage egg 
futures contracts. Additionally, the length of trading period for new contract 
months-those which had never been traded in the old storage egg futures-waS 
relatively low. This may be because of two counts. For one thing, the habit and 
tradition of the traders impeded their adjustments to the new fresh shell egg 
futures contract .. Secondly, frequent changes with respect to the contract specifi-
cations tended to confuse the traders and hence discouraged them from the use of 
the new fresh shell egg contract. Recently the traders have become acquainted 
more with the fresh egg contract . New contract months were opened at a longer 
distance from maturity and became more actively traded as well. 
Discussion of the Results of the Analysis of the Effect of a Change in 
Delivery System on Cash-Futures Price Relationship and Conclusions. 
The statistical analysis revealed that cash prices tended to stay above the 
futures price in the delivering month of the contract during the period of the 
in-plant delivery system. The difference was greater during the period in which 
delivery could be made from the egg packing plant only, than during the period 
in which }n-plant delivery was provided as an option to warehouse delivery. The 
options of the sellers and buyers to make and receive delivery other than buying 
and selling futures to offset their position, should force futures price to converge 
nicely to the cash price in the delivery month . Contrarily, during the period in 
which eggs must be delivered from approved egg packing plant only, all the ten 
futures contracts used for the analysis revealed that futures were sold at a discount 
below the Chicago cash market at an average of 5.48 cents per dozen. For the 
period in which both warehouse and in-plant deliveries could be made, futures 
contracts were sold at a discount of 1.05 cents per dozen, on the average, below 
the cash market in the delivery month . There was little or no price differential 
between cash and futures in the delivery month during the period in which only 
warehouse delivery was permitted . Can this lead us to conclude that the di-
vergence of cash price and futures price in the maturing month was a consequence 
from the change in the delivery procedure from warehouse to in-plant delivery? 
Manifestly, the in-plant delivery procedure helps contribute to the ease of 
making delivery . Many short hedgers, particularly the egg packers, were re-
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ported to use futures trading as a means of merchandising eggs. The lack of viable 
centralized cash egg markets which is due , perhaps, to the termination of the 
trading in two major traditional cash markets in Chicago and New York, and the 
advantage from the discounts provided by the egg futures contracts for delivery 
outside the Chicago area, associated with the excess supplies of uncommitted 
eggs, are the main reasons that attribute to the use of futures market as a sales 
outlet for eggs. 4 On the long sides of the transactions, which are normally 
dominated by the speculators who are in general not members of the egg 
industry, receiving a delivery may be a painful experience . The present in-plant 
delivery procedure requires prompt removal of eggs from the packing plant by 
those who receive eggs and redelivery is not allowed. Most speculators participate 
in futures trading with no intention of receiving the commodity . When a long 
speculator receives the delivery notice, he has to remove the eggs within three 
days or be penalized. Under great pressure, the speculator who receives eggs 
frequently ends up selling the eggs at a discount. Another disadvantage for the 
longs to take delivery is that the time and place of delivery is made at the 
discretion of the short, so delivery may be made at some outlying locations with 
no transportation available. This kind of situation can force the long who receives 
the eggs to sell them at a heavy loss . Even worse, delivery made from approved 
plants outside the Chicago area are subject to a discount based on transportation 
cost from the location to Chicago. These freight allowances are fixed by the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and are believed to be lower than the actual cost 
and hence are unfavorable to the long receiving a delivery. 
The prohibition of redelivery coerces the longs who eventually get the eggs 
to be prey of bargain hunting jobbers and breakers. Even though redelivery was 
permitted during the period in which either warehouse delivery or in-plant 
delivery could be made, there were extra costs and penalty involved which cer-
tainly discouraged redelivery. Very few redeliveries were reported in this period . 
The longs who hold their contracts into the delivery month are in trepidation 
of receiving eggs and are likely to be compelled into liquidation at a discount. 
The pressure upon the longs would be aggravated if supply of eggs is relatively 
greater than demand during the delivery month . If demand exceeds supply, a 
bull market may prevail and there are few deliveries and shorts have good markets 
for their eggs . 
When warehouse delivery was enforced, redelivery was permitted. The Voss 
study revealed that during March 1969-December 1970, the period in which 
delivery to approved cold storage warehouse only was required, the total de-
liveries were 3708 cars of which 2140 cars or about 58 percent were redeliveries 
with number of times redelivered ranging from 1 to 13.5 The option of re-
delivery enabled the long speculators to trade in the delivery month without 
any fear of receiving eggs. The large numbers of speculators in the delivery 
month add more liquidity to the futures market and help keep futures prices in 
line. However, manipulation may occur if the longs stop a large number of de-
liveries by taking eggs out of the delivery channel, thereby exerting a price in-
creasing effect on futures. Without the balance of discretion between the buyer 
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and the seller, cash-futures relationship would be determined more by other 
forces rather than by demand and supply conditions . 
The analysis shows that during the period of delivery at warehouse only, for 
26 contracts, the futures price exceeded cash price in the delivery month in six 
contracts while futures were sold below cash price in five contracts. Of all eleven 
contracts in the period of either warehouse or in-plant delivery, futures price was 
higher than cash price in three contracts, and lower than cash price in four con-
tracts. In the period of in-plant delivery only, all the ten contracts were sold at a 
discount to cash market at the maturing month . Indeed, the present in-plant 
delivery system with the prohibition of redelivery is unfavorable to the longs 
who hold the contracts during the maturing month . They may be forced into 
liquidation at a discount . Thus, there is an adequate reason to claim that the 
change in delivery system of fresh shell egg futures contract from warehouse 
delivery to in-plant delivery has an undesirable impact on the cash-futures price 
relationship in the delivery month . 
The Futures Price as a Predictor of Cash Prices 
No evidence was found that distant futures prices were good predictOrs of 
cash prices in the delivery month either during the period in which only 
warehouse delivery was permitted or during the period in which both warehouse 
and in-plant deliveries could be made. Distant futures prices underestimated cash 
prices during the former period but overestimated the cash prices during the 
latter period. 
During the period in which only warehouse delivery was permitted, changes 
in the most distant futures prices (9, 10, and 11 months distant from maturity of 
the contract) were not relevant at all to changes in cash prices. This should not be 
surprising as it is extremely difficult to predict the price that would exist almost a 
year in advance. For other distant futures prices, near distant futures prices 
were found to be more highly related to current cash prices than were more 
distant futures. These results reflected the fact that distant futures prices are 
formed by basing on the expected supply and demand conditions and cash price is 
determined by the current supply and demand conditions . New information may 
indeed change expectations, but this is reflected in the futures prices . The range 
of prices at a point in time is based on the information then available, but new 
events and information may make the forecast of the previous period incorrect . 
Hence , futures and cash prices are prone to be determined by the same piece of 
information and thus tend to be close tOgether as the futures contract approaches 
maturity. 
Futures prices are influenced by the expected demand and supply conditions 
through the interaction of the buyers and sellers in the futures market. New 
purchases and short coverings are made in anticipation of price increase and add a 
price-increasing force on futures . Conversely, new sales and long liquidation are 
made in anticipation of price decline and produce a price-decreasing effect on 
futures . During the period in which only warehouse delivery could be made, 
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distant futures prices were, on the average, low relative to cash prices in the 
delivery month, reflecting an expectation of large supply of eggs with weak 
demand at the time the contracts reached maturity. 
As mentioned earlier, short covering and long liquidation may be made 
because of the imbalance of the buyers and sellers with no relevance to the ex-
pected demand and supply conditions. In such a case, futures and cash prices are 
determined independently by different forces. This was evident for the near dis-
tant futures prices during the period in which either warehouse or in-plant 
deliveries could be made. Near distant futures prices were less related to current 
cash prices than were more distant futures. Particularly, at one month before 
maturity, change in futures price had almost no correlation with cash price. The 
suggested explanation to this is that the change in futures price just prior to the 
delivery month was due to large amounts of long liquidation because the longs 
did not want to hold their contracts into the delivery month and take a risk of get-
ting involved in a delivery. Larzelere and Horowitz found that futures prices pre-
ceding the delivery month were peculiarly low during the period which involved 
in-plant delivery procedure. 6 
During the period of in-plant delivery only, futures prices at around four to 
five months distant from maturity were shown to be good forecasts of cash prices 
in the maturing months. The expected demand and supply conditions formed at 
four to five months preceding the maturity of the contracts did come close to the 
real conditions in the delivery months. Yet, other distant futures prices were 
downward biased estimators of cash prices in the current months. 
In sum, the change in the delivery procedure from warehouse delivery to 
in-plant delivery seemed to have no effect on the prediction abiliry of futures 
prices . During the three periods of different delivery procedures, distant futures 
prices were in general not a good self-fulfilling forecast of cash prices in the 
delivery month. The futures price of fresh shell eggs at a point in time is 
determined by the information regarding the expected demand and supply at that 
time. 
The Effect of Change in Delivery Procedure on Returns to Traders in Fresh 
Shell Egg Futures 
Who makes money in fresh shell egg futures market during the three periods 
of different delivery procedure and how do they do it? Since futures markets are 
generally treated as hedging-speculative dichotomies, the question to be dealt 
with is the determination of which class of traders, hedgers or speculators, make 
profits at the expense of the other. In the futures market any gains are from the 
losses of someone else--a sum zero game. The measurements of profits and losses 
by classes of traders have been used by many market analysts as a method to detect 
the existence of the Theory of Normal Backwardation in futures markets. 7 
However, the estimation of gains and losses of the traders in this study would 
determine how the change in delivery system of the fresh shell egg futures 
contract might affect the relative opportunities of speculators vis-a-vis hedgers 
who participate in the trading as they adjust in response to these changes. The 
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profits and losses of traders are mainly based on two basic elements: the volume 
and composition of commitments which the traders take up in the futures market 
and the movement of the futures prices. 
Methodology Used for the Determination of the Traders' Profits and 
Losses 
The method of estimating profi ts and losses of the traders is similar to that 
used by Houthakker. 8 It is based on monthly figures of open commitments and 
futures prices. Open commitment is the number of contracts which have been 
bought or sold without the transaction having been completed by subsequent sale 
or repurchase or actual delivery or receipt of commodity . The commitments are 
divided into three groups: reporting large hedging, reporting large speculative, 
and non-reporting. To estimate profits and losses it is hypothetically assumed 
that the commi tments of a group of traders that exist at the end of the month are 
opened at the average price during that month and close out at the average price 
during the following month. The profit or loss of that group is then found by 
multiplying the end of month position by the change in average price. Commis-
sion charges have been ignored throughout. Specifically, the profits and losses of 
traders were estimated on the basis of the following six strategies. 
1. Commitments of traders are opened three months before the maturity of 
the contract and liquidation takes place two months prior to the delivery month. 
2. Commitments of traders are opened three months before the maturity of 
the contract and liquidation takes place one month prior to the delivery month. 
3. Commi tments of traders are opened three months before the mat uri ty of 
the contract and liquidation takes place in the delivery month. 
4. Commitments of traders are opened two months before the maturity of 
the contract and liquidation takes place one month prior to the delivery month. 
5. Commitments of traders are opened two months before the maturity of 
the contract and liquidation takes place in the delivery month. 
6. Commitments of traders are opened one month before the maturity of the 
contract and liquidation takes place in the delivery month . 
The statistics of open commitments by type of contract made available by the 
Commodity Exchange Authority, are classified according to (1) reporting 
speculators, (2) reporting hedgers, and (3) non-reporting traders. Each of these 
major categories is further divided into long and short positions. The number of 
open commitments are also classified by futures contracts. However, the traders' 
commitments are not cross-classified according to contract month. It therefore 
has to be assumed that open commitments for groups of traders are distributed to 
each futures open contract by using the open commitments of the open contract as 
a weight. Stated differently, the proportion of commitments held by each trading 
group is assumed to be equal for each open contract. There are at least twO 
arguments why there might be a tendency towards similar proportional represen-
tation by trading groups in all contract months open: (1) Since changes in the 
composition of trade affect prices, it is probably that as arbitrage activities of 
hedgers and speculators serve to reduce price imbalances between contract 
months, that they would be more likely to reduce compositional differences 
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between contracts as well. (2) Hedge-anticipator speculators earn their returns by 
trading on dips and bulges occasioned by the entrance of large hedging orders. 
Though one contract month has much greater use than another one open at the 
same time, the proportions of hedging and speculation would tend to be much 
the same. 9 
Though the statistics of the traders' commitments are available, only traders 
with large positions are actually classified as hedgers and speculators. A relatively 
larger percentage of the commitments are merely classified as non-reporting 
traders. It is simply derived from the difference between the total commitments 
and the reported large hedgers and speculators. The non-reporting traders are 
traditionally ascribed as small speculators despite the tact that hedging is also 
included . In an attempt to dichotomize the small traders into either hedgers 
speculators only, the non-reporting group must be apportioned between hedgers 
and speculators. A method of apportionment which has been proposed by 
Holbrook Working lO is utilized in this study . 
The profits and losses of the traders are first estimated for large hedging, large 
speculators, and non-reporting, and later the non-reporting traders' profits and 
losses are apportioned to small hedging and small speculators. 
Comparison of Gains and Losses of Traders Among the Three Groups on 
the Same Basis 
The estimation of the gains and losses by classes of traders during the three 
periods of different delivery procedure was based on different number of contracts 
and open commitments. In addition, the trading unit specified in the contract 
was also different among the three groups . In order to compare the gains and 
losses of traders among the three groups, these differentials had to be adjusted to 
the equivalent bases. Instead of making the comparison on the individual basis of 
the six strategies, the comparison is made on the basis of the average of the six 
strategies. Since the strategies were hypothetical and no single strategy seemed to 
represent t:1e actual strategy used by the traders, the estimation on the basis of the 
average would be appropriate and the results of the analysis would not be 
impaired. The comparison was made on the basis of 10,000 open commitments 
and a trading unit of a carlot of 600 cases of 30 dozen each by using the average of 
the six strategies. (Table 2). The impact of price changes is in Table 3. 
The results provided prima facie evidence of forecasting skill of large 
speculators. The profits of the large speculators were derived from the long side 
during the period of warehouse delivery; but from the short side during the 
periods which involved in-plant delivery system. The large speculators were able 
to adjust their positions from long side to short side of the transaction when the 
change in delivery system was favorable to the shorts. In all three periods large 
speculators gained regardless of whether prices were falling or rising . They were 
accurate in their choice of taking net long or net short positions. Large speculators 
are professionals whose earnings are based on dealing in futures market. They 
have to be alert to the changes that occur in the system and react accordingly. 
Large speculators, like ordinary businessmen, need to earn adequate profits to 
stay in the business. Large speculators gained in all three periods of different de-
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Large 
Speculators 
Long 
Shore 
Net 
Large 
Hedgers 
Long 
Shore 
Net 
Small 
Traders 
Long 
Shore 
Net 
Small 
SpeC/(lators 
Long 
Shore 
Net 
Small 
Hedgers 
Long 
Shore 
Net 
Table 2 
Comparison of Gains (+) and Losses (-) of Traders 
Among the Three Groups on the Basis of 10,000 
Open Commitments and a CarlOt of 18,000 
Dozens in Millions of Dollars 
Group I 
+ 1.06628 
-0.51888 
+0.54740 
+0.03847 
-0.43262 
-0.39415 
+2.40418 
-2.55743 
-0.15325 
+2 .27223 
-1.23627 
+ 1.03596 
+0. 13195 
-1.32116 
- 1. 18921 
Group II 
-0.83279 
+0.92629 
+0.09350 
-0.12431 
+0.26583 
+0.14152 
-3.37753 
+3.14251 
-0.23502 
-2 .50944 
+1.65301 
-0 .85643 
-0.86809 
+ 1.48950 
+0.62141 
Group III 
-0.20222 
+0.30417 
+0.10195 
-0.04936 
+0.20688 
+0.15752 
-0.97895 
+0.71948 
-0.25947 
-0.88537 
+0.23114 
-0.65423 
-0.09358 
+0.48834 
+0.39476 
livery procedure. However, their profits during the period of warehouse delivery 
only, were greater than during the period which involved in-plant delivery pro-
cedure. 
Large and small hedgers who were net short in general gained in the period in 
which in-plant delivery could be made but lost in the period of warehouse de-
livery only. During the period of warehouse delivery only and the period of in-
plant delivery only (Group I and Group III), large and small hedgers gained when 
prices were falling but lost when prices were rising. During the period in which 
either warehouse delivery or in-plant delivery could be made, large and small 
hedgers gained when prices were changing in either direction. Even though 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Gains (+) and Losses (-) of Traders Among 
the Three Groups with Respect to Changes in 
Futures Prices in Millions of Dollars 
Group Price Rising Price Falling 
Large Speculators +0.52892 +0.01848 
Large Hedgers -0.50243 +0. 10828 
Small Traders -0.02649 -0.12676 
Small Speculators + 1.49158 - 0.45562 
Small Hedgers -1.51807 +0.32886 
II 
Large Speculators +0.01811 +0.07539 
Large Hedgers +0.00793 +0.13359 
Small Traders -0.02604 -0.20898 
Small Speculators -0.05475 -0.80168 
Small Hedgers +0.02871 +0.59270 
III 
Large Speculators -0.22409 +0 .32604 
Large Hedgers -0. 17366 +0.3.3118 
Small Traders +0 . .)9775 -0.65722 
Small Specularors +0.87724 -1.53147 
Small Hedgers -0.47949 +0.87425 
Net 
+0.54740 
-0.39415 
-0. 15325 
+ 1.03596 
-1.18921 
+0 .09350 
+0.14152 
-0.23502 
-0.85643 
+0.62141 
+0.10195 
+0. 15752 
-0.25947 
-0.65423 
+0 .. 39476 
hedgers were net short all the time, they were able to make profit when futures 
prices were rising providing the long commitments were associated with the con-
tract whose increase in futures price was exceptionally high. 
Small speculators gained in the period of warehouse delivery only but failed to 
make any profits in the period which involved in-plant delivery. Lack of forecast-
ing ability was apparent from the results of the small speculators' gains and losses 
which were connected to the change in futures prices. Small speculatOrs expected 
only that prices would increase and always maintained a long position. Most 
small speculatOrs are neither members of the egg industry nor members in futures 
industry. Many do not have full knowledge and understanding in either market . 
The only purpose they commonly share is to gamble by taking the long side of the 
transaction in futures trading. Small speculatOrs are from people of a wide scope 
of livelihoods . From a market survey covering the period from November 28 
through December 5, 1969, conducted by Commodity Exchange Authority on 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange , it was reported that speculators not in the egg 
industry and not in the futures industry, represented about 80 percent of all 
traders and were people from over thirty occupations. 11 Those who experienced a 
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loss would leave the trading but there would be a great many people willing to 
gamble on the price prospect by taking up a long position in futures. This may 
explain why the small speculators still maintained net long position in Group III 
although the net long position in Group II did not give them any profits. How-
ever, the losses of small traders in Group III was somewhat less than in Group II. 
Small traders' losses during the period which involved in-plant delivery 
procedure (Group II and Group III) were the mainspring of profits for other 
traders, large speculators and large and small hedgers, who shared in proportion 
to their net short positions . This finding was contradictory to the concept that the 
essence of futures trading is the transfer of price risks from the hedgers to the 
speculators in return for a risk premium. 
In short, the results of the estimation of gains and losses by classes of traders 
during the three periods of different delivery procedure bring forth the following 
two important conclusions . 
1. The change in the delivery procedure from warehouse delivery to in-plant 
delivery yielded an undue favor to the shoft . 
2. Large speculators possessed a better forecasting skill than small 
speculators . 
The Effect of Change in Delivery System on Price Variation in the Cash Egg 
Market 
Price variation in cash market can possibly be influenced by futures trading 
through the effects of excessive speculation, imbalance of power between buyers 
and sellers, and means of contract settlement. Price variation which is caused by 
these noneconomic forces is undesirable and is regarded as the variation in the 
random element of price series. 
Traditionally, the futures market is not used to any appreciable extent for the 
merchandising of commodities; rather, it serves as a medium for speculation 
and hedging. Most contracts never go to delivery, but instead are offset by 
making opposite transactions . This typical futures market, however, is not well 
represented by the present fresh shell egg futures market. Since the introduction 
of fresh shell egg futures contract, the fresh shell egg futures market has been 
increasingly used as a device to merchandise eggs by many members in the egg 
industry. 
The number of deliveries was relatively small when compared to the total 
volume of trade and total production of eggs, it accounted for less than 1 percent 
of the total volume of trade and total production for all the three groups. De-
liveries were in greater number when compared to the open commitments on the 
last business day preceding the maturing contract month . The percentage of the 
open commitments held into the delivery month and settled by actual de-
livery was 8.40 percent for Group I, 15.31 percent for Group II, and 10.54 
percent for Group III. Coincidently, the variance of the random component of 
cash price series was largest during the period in which deliveries could be made 
at either warehouses or egg packing plants (Group II) and the number of 
deliveries against egg futures contracts was also greatest in this same period 
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(Group II). The variance of the random element of cash prices was smallest and so 
was the number of deliveries (in terms of percentage of total egg production' 
during the period in which deliveries could be made only at certified plant 
(Group III). It was obvious that variance of the random element in cash egg price: 
varied directly with the number of deliveries under fresh shell egg futures 
contracts. 
Delivering eggs on the futures contract seemed to be in response to the changes 
in market situations rather than to the changes in the delivery system, consider-
ing the fact that the number of eggs delivered was numerous in the surplus 
period but dwindled when supply of eggs declined. To illustrate, during the 
period of surplus of eggs from July 1970 to March 1971, the last part of the 
period under warehouse delivery procedure only, 11. 16 percent of the contracts 
held into the delivery mon ths were settled by actual delivery. During the period 
of small supply of eggs from September 1972-December 1972, the number of 
deliveries was 6 . 38 percent of the contract open commitments being held into the 
delivery months . It was clearly evident that the increasing number of deliveries 
was not encouraged by the easier in-plant delivery system . There were quite a 
number of deliveries under the fresh shell egg futures contract before the initia-
tion of only in-plant delivery procedure. Deliveries for some contract months 
were in small number even during the period of in-plant delivery procedure 
only. The number of deliveries against egg futures contracts was greatest during 
the period in which in-plant delivery was provided as another option to ware-
house delivery . This might mislead many to believe that the increase in deliveries 
was supported by the initiated in-plant delivery system. The large surplus of 
eggs happened to exist at the time the in-plant delivery was initiated and thus the 
large number of deliveries were in response to large surplus of eggs not to the 
change in the delivery procedure. 
Even though the easier in-plant delivery procedure alone could not encourage 
the deliveries against the futures contract, it could be additional force to facilitate 
the deliveries providing the market conditions were conducive to the use of 
futures contract as a means to merchandise eggs. During the month of ample 
supply of eggs and weak demand, egg producers and packers had the problem of 
selling their eggs at a satisfactory price. For those egg producers and packers who 
hedged short in the futures, they could have locked in the expected price by 
simply making delivery. Yet, they could settle their positions by buying back the 
contract at a cheaper price because the in-plant delivery procedure could not 
pressure on the longs to liquidate their positions at a discount. However , the 
gains the egg producers and packers obtained from the futures might not be able 
to cover the low price they would get in the cash market. Making delivery might 
be the best alternative for such situations since they could assuredly lock in the 
expected price without the need to solicit sales of their eggs to the potential 
buyers. Marketing through short futures sales enabled the sellers to sell eggs to 
the buyers against the buyers' will. The buyers were not given a chance to 
negotiate with the sellers on the same level over the terms of trade with regard to 
volume) quality) and point of delivery . The shorts making deliveries from points 
outside Chicago also were benefited from the discount of freight allowances 
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which were biased against the longs receiving eggs if the freight allowance is less 
than the actual cost of transportation. Deliveries under fresh shell egg futures 
contract tended to be in large number when there was egg surplus in the market. 
Since the eggs delivered against the futures contracts were from excessive supplies 
of eggs rather than diverted from normal channels of trade, the variance of the 
random element of cash egg price would be least affected. Fresh shell egg futures 
contract could serve as a device to transfer eggs from point of excessive supplies to 
egg-defici t market. However, there was a possibility that the subsequent sales of 
delivered eggs might take place in the market which was already flooded with 
surplus eggs. In addition, the requirement of prompt removal of delivered eggs 
from the plant could force those receiving eggs to sell their eggs at a large 
discount. Hence, the numerous egg deliveries could be price-disruptive and 
accentuate the variance of the random element of cash egg price. 
Analysis revealed that there was no strong evidence to claim that the change 
in delivery procedure of fresh shell egg futures contract was associated with the 
unwarrantable fluctuations in cash prices of eggs. The differences of the variances 
of the random component in cash prices during the three periods of different 
delivery procedure were due to other factors such as the excessive speculation and 
the market conditions of the outlets for delivered eggs. Though the variation in 
the random element was different among the three groups, the existing differ-
ences appeared to be relatively minor. The standard deviation of the random 
component in cash prices were eq ui valent to .70 cent, .81 cent, and .55 cent 
for Group I, Group II, and Group III, respectively. The reason that can be cited as 
being responsible for the small random variation in cash prices is that market 
participants are informed of fundamental supply and demand conditions through 
futures trading. The existence of fresh shell egg futures market provides all 
members in the egg industry a center where information regarding economic 
conditions are gathered and interpreted. Cash price variation is largely linked to 
the interaction between demand and supply in the market. 
Evaluation of the Changes in Delivery System of Fresh Shell Egg Futures 
Contract 
The changes in delivery system of fresh shell egg futures contract have an 
impact on the egg futures trading . The purpose of this discussion is to evaluate 
the changes with regard to the effects on the level of business and performance of 
fresh shell egg futures market. 
Changes in trading volume and open contracts best measure the increased use 
of fresh shell egg futures by speculators and hedgers. The trading was light for a 
short period of a few months prior to and after the changes occurred. When the 
fresh shell egg futures contract which called for the delivery offresh eggs only was 
initiated, beginning with the February, 1969 contract, both the trading volume 
and open commitments began at low levels for the first five months but increased 
steadily until the late 1970's. Starting with the April, 1971 contract through the 
February, 1972 contract, eggs which formerly could be delivered from certified 
cold storage warehouses only were permitted to be delivered from certified egg 
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packing plants as well. During this period, the volume of trading and open 
commitments for every month were at much lower levels than those on the same 
month in the period of warehouse delivery only. When warehouse delivery 
procedure was eliminated and only in-plant delivery was permitted beginning 
with the March 1972 contract, the trading was thin in the first few months of 
1972 but there was a marked increase in the volume of trades and open commit-
ments in the second half of 1972. On the average, the monthly volume of trades 
and open contracts during the period of in-plant delivery only were at about the 
same level as during the period under either warehouse or inplant delivery but 
far below the levels during the period in which only warehouse delivery could be 
made. (See Table 4.) 
The low volume of trading and open contracts around the time the changes in 
delivery procedure occurred should not be surprising. The market was still 
experimenting on the new contract provision and adjusting to it. It was expected 
that traders would not like to venture into the trading when a new contract 
provision was first initiated. The traders needed time to observe how well the new 
provision fitted their needs before taking part in the futures trading. During the 
period in which only warehouse delivery could be made, trading in fresh shell egg 
futures market was very active. The annual volume of trading in 1970 amounted 
to as high as 678,801 carlots which well surpassed the all-time high record of 
491,096 carlots for the old cold storage egg futures trading in 1960. Unfortu-
nately, the provision of in-plant delivery as an option to warehouse delivery had 
resulted in a drastic decline in the use of the fresh shell egg futures contracts. 
However, under the present delivery procedure which allows eggs to be delivered 
from approved plants only, there was a significant increase in the volume of 
trading and open commitments during the second half of 1972. 
Performance of Fresh Shell Egg 
Futures Market 
The success of futures trading should not be looked upon from the high level 
of business on futures market alone. More importantly the success of fresh shell 
egg futures trading should be considered from the standpoint of how well it 
performs useful functions for the egg industry as a whole. Generally, there are 
two important economic functions performed by futures market: (1) To make 
possible the shifting of risk from those who wish to avoid it to those who elect to 
bear it; (2) To assist in the process of price discovery. These would provide a 
convenient framework to evaluate the impacts of the changes on the performance 
of fresh egg futures market. 
Risk Shifting Function. To be sure, the fresh shell egg futures market could 
provide hedging facilities to egg producers, dealers, processors, and others who 
bear the risks of egg production and marketing. But the main concern centers 
around the question of how well hedgers were protected in the fresh shell egg 
futures market and whether or not the change in the delivery provision resulted in 
better hedger protection. It was found that during the period in which the egg 
contract provided that deliveries could be made at warehouses only, cash price 
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and futures price tended to converge nicely in the delivery month and distant 
fututes prices were in general lower than the ultimate cash price. The con-
vergence of cash and futures prices in the maturing month of the contract gave 
rise to the perfect hedge situation. Both long and short hedgers were fully 
protected; they could lock in the price they expected with neither losses nor gains 
from the hedge. However, if the short hedger could afford the risk involved he 
would have received a higher price by not hedging, since distant futures prices, 
on the average, underestimated cash price in the delivery month in this period. 
But it was advantageous for long hedger to hedge otherwise he would have had to 
pay for a higher price of eggs. 
During the period in which deliveries could be made at either warehouses or 
egg packing plants and the period in which deliveries could be made only at egg 
packing plants, cash price tended to stay above the futures price in the delivery 
month. On the average, the distant futures prices overestimated the cash price in 
the maturing month during the former period but underestimated the ultimate 
cash price during the latter period . The cash-futures price relationship in both 
periods indicated an imperfect hedge situation. The short hedger was over-
protected; that is, he acquired an average gain from the hedge. The long hedger 
was under-protected because he received a slight loss on his hedge. In other 
words, he had to pay a price greater than the price he wished to lock in. The 
change in delivery system from warehouse delivery to in-plant delivery was 
favorable to the short in the futures market. This assertion was supported by the 
results of the estimation of profits and losses of traders on fresh egg futures mar-
ket. It was revealed that short hedgers gained while long hedgers lost during the 
period which involved in-plant delivery procedute. If this bias continues to exist, 
the long hedgers who buy the contracts in the futures market would be dis-
couraged from participating in the trading. 
The easier in-plant delivery procedure was alleged as being biased against 
the longs. As a resu'lt the long speculators tended to close out their positions 
before the delivery month in order to avoid getting involved in a delivery. The 
light trading during the delivery month might be responsible for the greater 
fluctuations in futures prices. This might increase the margin requirement 
markedly and hedging would become a costly means of transferring risks. Data 
demonstrates clearly that the volume of trading and open commitments in the 
delivery month during the period which involved in-plant delivery procedure 
(Groups II and III) were much lower than those appearing during the period of 
warehouse delivery only. 
Pricing Function. One of the primary roles of a futures market is the determi-
nation of prices for the present, and projecting them into the future . The pricing 
function for futures markets of storable commodities concentrated on the ration-
ing of current supply for current use and inventory to be used at a future time . 12 
However, forward-pricing function has become somewhat more important for 
futures trading in non-storable commodities like fresh shell eggs. 
Duting the three periods of different delivery procedure, the distant futures 
prices were shown not to be good predictors of cash prices in the delivery months. 
Distant futures prices underestimated cash prices in the delivery month during 
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Table 4 
Volume of Trading and Open Commirmenrs in rhe Delivery Monrh. Fresh Shell Egg Furures 
Chicago Mercanrile Exchange. February 1969-December 1972 - Number of Conrracrs 
VOLUME OF TRADING" OPEN COMMITMENTS .... 
Group 
Monrh Group I Group II III Group I Group II 
1969 1970 1971 1971 1972 1972 1969 1970 1971 1971 1972 
Jan. 15812 9977 4271 1595 1109 484 
Feb. 6238 32381 3694 1402 590 2347 631 212 
March 4799 22995 6475 8585 594 3537 716 
April 7000 1742 1 4172 750 1593 1599 853 
May 923 8966 2648 4750 263 1433 525 
June 339 8656 1606 459 88 1182 219 
July 2694 1825 4778 2651 356 141 472 
Aug . 307 25 1781 396 54 3 166 
Sepr. 22714 18872 10613 6746 3040 2589 563 
Ocr. 9022 10767 5434 1469 1189 1588 409 
Nov. 30927 6193 3208 5928 1538 720 158 
Dec. 17091 15275 13434 12173 1539 1469 1153 
Monrhly 
4850 4391 474 Average 10823 12 19 
.. The average of reading volume in rhe delivery monrh of rhe conrracr monrh indicared . 
.... The average open commirmenrs in rhe delivery monrh of rhe conrracr monrh indicared . 
Group 
III 
684 
III 
750 
53 
228 
34 
1253 
121 
447 
1123 
480 
the period of warehouse delivery only and during the period of in-plant delivery 
only. Ultimate cash prices were overestimated by distant futures prices during 
the period in which either warehouse or in-plant delivery could be made. At any 
rate, futures prices were estimates of what should be expected on the basis of 
contemporarily available information concerning present and probable future 
demand and supply . During the period which involved in-plant delivery proce-
dure, the fluctuations offutures prices at one month prior to the maturity of the 
contract and during the delivery month , reflected the inbalance of the futures 
market rather than the demand and supply conditions . However, the erratic 
fluctuations in the futures prices exerted little influence on the cash egg prices. 
The results of analysis showed a slight variation of the random component in cash 
egg prices which could have been brought about by excessive futures price 
variation due to factors other than changes in economic conditions . 
During the period of warehouse delivery only and of in-plant delivery only, 
prices of distant futures were less variable than cash prices. Hence , producer 
hedging in fresh egg futures market would tend to stabilize revenue . 
Summary and Review of the Study 
The relatively recent changes in the delivery system of fresh shell egg futures 
contract from cold storage warehouse delivery to egg packing plant delivery were 
rational from the standpoints that cold storage eggs tend to drift outside the 
normal industry marketing channels and cold storage space for eggs in the 
Chicago area-the points of par delivery of eggs-was scarce. First, eggs which 
formerly could be delivered from approved cold storage warehouses only with the 
redelivery provision were allowed to be delivered from certified egg packing 
plants as well. Later, the warehouse delivery was eliminated and at the present 
time only in-plant delivery can be made with no redelivery provision. The 
changes in the delivery procedure were met with widespread criticisms from 
traders in the fresh shell egg futures market. It has been alleged that the changes 
in delivery in-plant system were destructive as the easier in-plant delivery proce-
dure would be favorable to the short making delivery and would encourage 
numerous deliveries of eggs and this might drive the long traders out of the 
market as well as cause disruption of normal channel of trade. 
The primary objectives of this study were to analyze the changes in the 
delivery system of fresh shell egg futures contract in terms of their points of 
inpact: (1) on the cash-futures price relationship in the delivery month of the 
contract, (2) on the prediction ability of futures prices, (3) on the returns to 
traders, and (4) on the price variation in the cash egg market. 
The data used in this study were classified into three groups according to the 
three periods of different delivery procedure of the fresh shell egg futures 
contract. Group I represented the period in which delivery could be made from 
approved cold storage warehouses only and covered contracts for the months of 
February, 1969 through March, 1971. Group II represented the period in which 
delivery could be made from either approved warehouses or from approved egg 
packing plants and covered contracts for the months of April, 1971 through 
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February, 1972. Group III represented the period in which delivery could be 
made from approved egg packing plants only and covered contracts for the 
months of March, 1972 through December, 1972. 
It was found that cash and futures prices tended to converge nicely in the 
delivery month during the period in which only warehouse delivery was permit-
ted; but cash price stayed above futures price in the delivery month during the 
period which involved the in-plant delivery system. The price differential be-
tween cash and futures was smaller during the period in which in-plant delivery 
was provided as an option to warehouse delivery than during the period of in-
plant delivery only. Quantitatively, futures contracts were sold during the de-
livery month at a discount below the cash market at an average of 1.05 cents per 
dozen and 5.48 cents per dozen during the foregoing two periods respectively. 
The reason why futures contracts were sold at a discount below the cash market in 
the delivery month apparently was because of the imbalance of discretion between 
buyers and sellers which existed in the egg futures market under the in-plant 
delivery procedure. The in-plant delivery procedure did not allow eggs to be re-
delivered and the longs, after receipt of the notice of tender, were required to 
remove eggs from the plant promptly or be penalized. The longs receiving de-
livery usually ended up selling the eggs at a loss under great pressure. This was in 
addition to the usual disadvantage for the longs that the time and place of de-
livery, as well as the quality of eggs delivered, were made at the discretion of the 
sellers . Therefore, the longs who held their contracts into the delivery month in 
fear of receiving eggs and were likely to be compelled into liquidation at a dis-
count. 
No evidence was found that the prediction ability of futures prices was 
affected by the changes in delivery procedure offresh shell egg futures contract. 
By and large, futures prices were not good predictors of cash prices in the delivery 
month during the three periods of different delivery provision. Distant futures 
prices underestimated cash prices during the period of warehouse delivery only 
and the period of in-plant delivery only. However, cash prices in the delivery 
months were overestimated by distant futures prices during the period in which 
delivery could be made either at the warehouse or at the plants. Despite the fact 
that futures prices were in general not agood self-fulfilling forecast of cash prices, 
changes in cash prices were usually correspondent to changes in distant futures 
prices in different degrees of magnitude but in the same direction, implying both 
prices were determined by the same economic forces to some extent. As a matter 
of fact, futures prices during the three periods of different delivery procedure 
were found to reflect the general demand and supply conditions then existing in 
the egg economy. 
The estimation of gains and losses of the traders in fresh shell egg futures 
market was made on the basis of six hypothetical strategies in order to determine 
how the change in delivery system of the fresh egg futures contract might affect 
the relative opportunities of speculators vis-a-vis hedgers who participated in the 
trading. The gains and losses were estimated for large hedgers, large specula-
tors, and nonreporting traders on both long and short positions and nonreporting 
traders' profits and losses were further apportioned to small hedgers and small 
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speculatOrs. The results of the estimation revealed that the traders with long 
positions gained and those with short positions lost during the period in which 
only warehouse delivery could be made. But the longs lost and the shorts gained 
during the period which concerned the in-plant delivery system. The results 
provided clear-cut evidence of forecasting skill of large speculators. The profits 
of the large speculators were derived from the long side during the period of 
warehouse delivery only, but from the short side during the period which in-
volved in-plant delivery system. The large speculators were capable of adjusting 
their positions from long side to short side of the transaction when the change 
in delivery system was favorable to the shorts. In all the three periods of different 
delivery system large speculators gained regardless of whether futures prices were 
rising or falling . Large and small hedgers who were net short in general gained in 
the period which involved the in-plant delivery provision but lost in the period 
of warehouse delivery only. Small speculatOrs gained in the period of warehouse 
delivery only but failed to make any profit during the period which concerned the 
in-plant delivery system. It was apparent that small speculators lacked forecast-
ing skill; they expected only that prices would increase and always maintained 
a net long position. Unlike large speculators, small speculators gained only when 
futures prices were rising and lost whenever futures prices were falling. 
In the analysis of the impact of the change in delivery system on the price 
variation in cash egg market , the method used first assumed that the cash prices 
series were composed of both a systematic and a random component. The 
systematic component of the time series varied with the fundamental economic 
conditions and its fluctuation was desirable . The variation in the random compo-
nent was undesirable because it could not be explained by underlying economic 
forces. If the change in delivery procedure from warehouse delivery to in-plant 
delivery gave rise to the unwarranted fluctuations in cash egg prices, the 
variation would appear in the random component. The empirical results showed 
that the variances of random elements for the three periods of different delivery 
provision, though relatively small, were statistically different. The variance 
of random component was largest during the period in which either warehouse 
delivery or in-plant delivery could be made, and smallest during the period of 
in-plant delivery only. So the variance of the random element in cash egg prices 
appeared to vary directly with the number of deliveries under fresh shell egg 
futures contract. Delivering eggs on the futures contract seemed to be in response 
to the change in market situations rather than to the changes in the delivery 
system. The number of eggs delivered was normally numerous in the surplus 
period but dwindled when supply of eggs declined. Therefore , the variance of the 
random element of cash egg prices was due to the excessive speculation and the 
market conditions rather than to the changes in the delivery procedure of the fresh 
shell egg futures contract . 
Concerning the levels of trading on fresh shell egg futures market during the 
three periods of different delivery procedure, the average monthly trading 
volume and open commitments during the period of in-plant delivery only were 
at a higher level than during the period under either warehouse or in-plant de-
livery but far below the levels during the period in which only warehouse delivery 
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could be made. It was obvious that the volume of trading and open commitments 
were low near the time the change in delivery system occurred. This reflected the 
situation where the market was still trying the new contract provision and 
adjusting to it. 
There was evidence that the change in delivery procedure of the fresh shell 
egg futures contract impaired the risk shifting function of the fresh egg futures 
market . During the period of warehouse delivery only, cash and futures prices 
tended to converge in the delivery month. This was the sine qua non for a perfect 
hedge situation in which both long and short hedgers were fully protected, that 
is, they could lock in the price they expected with neither losses nor gains from 
the hedge. However, during the period which involved the in-plant delivery 
system, cash price tended to stay above futures price in the delivery month. The 
cash-futures price relationship in this period indicated an imperfect hedge 
situation . It was found that the short hedger was over-protected whereas the long 
hedger was under-protected. The short hedger was able to acquire an average gain 
from the hedge but the long hedger had to pay a price greater than the one he 
wished to lock in. The change in delivery system from warehouse delivery to 
in-plant delivery neither vitiated nor improved the forward-pricing function of 
fresh shell egg futures market. No evidence was found that futures prices were 
good self-fulfilling forecast of cash prices in the delivery month during the three 
periods of different delivery procedures. 
In conclusion, the empirical findings from this study may lead to the 
acceptance of the hypothesis that the present change in delivery system of fresh 
shell egg futures contract from warehouse delivery to in-plant delivery was 
detrimental to the convergence of cash price and futures price in the delivery 
month and thereby gave rise to an imperfect hedge situation and the change was 
also favorable to traders on the short side of the transaction. However, no strong 
evidence could be found to support the proposition that the present change in 
delivery system of fresh shell egg futures contract caused unwarrantable price 
fluctuation in the cash egg market. 
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